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FREE SPEECH AND THE CONFLUENCE OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNET 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
Alan K. Chen* 
INTRODUCTION 
When one person exhorts another to violate the law, it is typically done 
through traditional modes of speech—the spoken or written word.  The 
appropriate treatment of what is commonly referred to as “advocacy of law 
violation”1 or “unlawful advocacy”2 under First Amendment doctrine has 
perplexed both courts and legal scholars for generations.  Conceptual 
complexities in drawing boundaries between potentially inciting speech and 
dangerous conduct make this an inherently difficult problem.3  But perhaps 
another reason for the confusion is that many of the important U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions in this area have come during times of real or perceived 
national crises. 
After years of wrangling with the issue, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio4 
established a strongly speech-protective orientation that prohibits the 
government from regulating “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”5  In recent years, 
commentators have questioned whether, in light of contemporary events, the 
Court should reconsider Brandenburg in favor of a more lenient standard that 
would permit the government to regulate more speech.6  As it happens, the 
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for the Fordham Law Review symposium entitled Terrorist Incitement on the Internet held at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Alexander Tsesis, 
Foreword:  Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2017).  Thanks to 
Alexander Tsesis for organizing this symposium and inviting me to participate and to all 
symposium participants, whose questions and comments helped me to think about these very 
difficult issues.  I am grateful to my research assistants, Justin Martin and Sarah Spears, for 
their help with this Article.  Any errors are mine. 
 
 1. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1038 (5th ed. 2015). 
 2. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment:  In 
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1982). 
 3. For a thoughtful and comprehensive treatment of these issues, see KENT 
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989). 
 4. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 5. Id. at 447. 
 6. By now, there is already a rich post-9/11 literature on this important topic.  For an 
argument that Brandenburg should be modified to some degree, see Eric Posner, ISIS Gives 
Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.slate.com/ 
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two primary justifications for a proposed modification arose at roughly the 
same time, around the beginning of the twenty-first century.  First, there have 
been calls to relax the Brandenburg standard to accommodate the rise of 
global and domestic terrorism, particularly since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.7  Here, the idea is that the increasing (and, it is argued, 
increasingly successful) efforts of terrorist organizations to recruit and incite 
people to commit unlawful acts suggest the need for greater leeway for 
government intervention to prevent death, injuries, and property destruction.8  
Second, scholars have called for a relaxed Brandenburg standard in light of 
the rapid expansion of digital communication technologies made possible 
through social media platforms.9  This claim suggests that there has been 
substantial growth in opportunities for terrorist incitement because of the 
wide availability of internet communication. 
In this Article, I argue that, notwithstanding these contemporary 
developments, the Court got it mostly right in Brandenburg.  Or, I want to at 
least suggest that it is premature to reconstruct the Brandenburg test to 
address perceived changes in our global environment.  For the most part, 
Brandenburg has succeeded in mediating the balance between protecting 
political or ideological advocacy and enabling the government to regulate 
actual incitement, even in the contemporary era.  Moreover, I argue that 
society should be especially wary of calls to narrow Brandenburg’s speech-
protective standard because such changes might be significantly influenced 
by the confluence of two forms of exceptionalism—national security 
exceptionalism and internet exceptionalism—both of which are continuing 
to evolve in real time. 
In development of this argument, this Article contains three parts.  Part I 
discusses how the law of incitement is situated in the evolution of modern 
free speech doctrine.  Next, Part II identifies and explains how national 
security exceptionalism and internet exceptionalism may work together to 
influence the relaxation of the Brandenburg test.  Finally, Part III argues that 
there is insufficient evidence at this point to suggest a strong need to 
recalibrate the Brandenburg test. 
 
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts
_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html [https://perma.cc/YPC4-3AW3].  For arguments in 
support of retaining the Brandenburg test notwithstanding contemporary developments, see 
generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME:  FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004); Judge Lynn Adelman & Jon 
Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet:  The Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2010); Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009). 
 7. See infra notes 52–80 and accompanying text. 
 8. Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, From Hip-Hop to Jihad, How the Islamic State 
Became a Magnet for Converts, WASH. POST (May 6, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/from-hip-hop-to-jihad-how-the-islamic-
state-became-a-magnet-for-converts/2015/05/06/b1358758-d23f-11e4-8b1e-
274d670aa9c9_story.html [https://perma.cc/5JBW-MQDU]. 
 9. See infra notes 82–108 and accompanying text. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
The modern understanding of the free speech doctrine is only about 100 
years old.10  During the past century, several understandings about the limits 
of government power to ban or regulate speech have become canonical.  The 
Supreme Court has typically followed the so-called two-level theory of 
speech.11  Under this model, speech that has high value in terms of advancing 
the goals of the Free Speech Clause (i.e., advancing democratic self-
governance, facilitating the search for “truth,” and promoting individual 
autonomy)12 is considered to have the highest level of constitutional 
protection from government regulation.  It is presumed that in adopting and 
enforcing legal regulations of high-value speech, the government may not 
discriminate against speakers based on their viewpoints or against speech 
because of its content.13  Such regulations are subject to the strictest form of 
judicial scrutiny.14 
But, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,15 the Court began carving out a 
distinct category of no- or low-value speech.  There, the Court defined 
categories of expression that are not “covered” by the First Amendment—
that is, their regulation is not even subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech 
Clause.16  This means that the government may not only regulate but may 
potentially even prohibit speech, such as obscenity17 and fighting words,18 
because it is outside the scope and concerns of the First Amendment.  The 
rationale typically provided for the Court’s exclusion of these forms of 
communication from the First Amendment’s coverage is that they have little 
or no social value.  But just as important is that these types of speech are also 
presumptively considered to be harmful.19  Recently, and somewhat 
controversially, the Court has suggested that this list of no- or low-value 
speech is based on historical recognition rather than categorical balancing.20 
 
 10. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“No 
important case involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United 
States [in 1919].”).  But see David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 
90 YALE L.J. 514, 520 (1981) (surveying judicial decisions and legal scholarship concerning 
free speech prior to World War I).  
 11. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 43 (2008) (discussing the application of the “two-level” 
theory). 
 12. These are the most commonly invoked reasons for protecting speech.  For a more 
extensive discussion and critique of these theories, see Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech 
Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016. 
 13. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 16. For a comprehensive discussion of the coverage-protection distinction, see generally 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
 17. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35–37 (1973). 
 18. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 19. Id. 
 20. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010).  But see Genevieve Lakier, 
The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2177–79 (2015) (disputing the 
Court’s historical account of low-value speech). 
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Under this two-level theory, First Amendment doctrine has never quite 
known what to do about government regulation of speech that advocates for 
others to violate the law.  The evolution of the relevant doctrine has been 
recounted numerous times, so a brief summary should suffice here.  Unlawful 
advocacy falls presumptively into neither the high- nor no-value categories.  
In part, this is because pure advocacy, even of such extreme ideas as the 
violent overthrow of government, can be a form of core political expression.  
But it also underscores the very real concern that when advocacy is strongly 
connected to unlawful conduct, its regulation might be necessary to avoid the 
Constitution becoming, as Justice Robert Jackson once wrote, “a suicide 
pact.”21 
In light of this tension, the Supreme Court first struggled with defining the 
boundary between protected advocacy and dangerous incitement in a series 
of early twentieth-century cases concerning critics of U.S. involvement in 
World War I and sympathizers with the Soviet revolution.  These cases—
involving prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act 
of 1918—ultimately led the Court to adopt a First Amendment test that 
permitted government regulation of advocacy of unlawful conduct when 
“words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”22  Although the “clear and present 
danger” test sounds like a fairly robust standard, the Court upheld numerous 
prosecutions under this analysis.  Notably, in Schenck v. United States,23 the 
Court found it irrelevant that the defendant’s advocacy for others to avoid the 
military draft was unlikely to influence any audience member because his 
intent for such an effect was sufficient to justify his conviction.24 
During the period of peace between World War I and World War II, the 
Court employed an even more deferential test that permitted government 
regulation of advocacy of law violation where the regulations were 
“reasonable.”25  Some form of the clear and present danger test reemerged 
during the McCarthy era, as federal prosecutors pursued convictions under 
the Smith Act, which criminalized advocacy or even teaching about the 
“duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any 
 
 21. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
Interestingly, unlawful advocacy cases have never drawn an express distinction among 
different types of law violations.  Thus, at least in theory, the Brandenburg test would be 
applied both in a case prosecuting an individual for advocating that another person commit a 
minor infraction, such as littering, and a case when a person advocated that another pursue the 
violent overthrow of the government. See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age 
of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 44 (2013) (describing this as Brandenburg’s “most 
significant ambiguity”); see also Goedert v. City of Ferndale, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1032 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that it is unclear whether Brandenburg includes incitement to 
nonviolent lawbreaking and holding that the city could not invoke the incitement doctrine to 
justify an ordinance banning signs encouraging motorists to honk their car horns in support of 
political demonstrations). 
 22. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 23. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 24. Id. at 52. 
 25. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1925). 
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government in the United States by force or violence.”26  In Dennis v. United 
States,27 the Court rejected facial and as-applied challenges to the Smith Act 
because such speech created a clear and present danger.28  In response to the 
claim that the danger of violent revolution resulting from the defendants’ 
speech was remote, the Court noted that because the seriousness of the harm 
sought to be prevented was so high, the low probability of success did not 
render the speech protected.29  Dennis substantially diluted First Amendment 
protection for unlawful advocacy.30  As Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, 
“the approach taken by the plurality in Dennis makes probability and 
imminence—two seeming requirements of a clear and present danger test—
irrelevant.”31 
Both the World War I-era and McCarthy-era cases were decided during 
wartime or during a time when many public officials engaged in alarmist 
posturing about substantial dangers to national security.  It is therefore not 
surprising that the Court’s next foray into the incitement doctrine did not 
come until 1969.  Since, at the time, the United States was heavily involved 
in military action in Southeast Asia, and the country’s deep divisions over 
that policy were starting to emerge, the perceived concern about undermining 
national security on American soil was not as clear.32  Brandenburg 
concerned a prosecution under a criminal syndicalism statute dating back to 
the post-World War I era, but the relevant expression involved racial epithets 
rather than workers’ rights or antiwar rhetoric.  The case came to the attention 
of prosecutors when a local television station broadcast a report from a rally 
by a local Ku Klux Klan faction.33  Clarence Brandenburg, a leader of that 
group, was shown on film giving a speech calling for “revengeance [sic]” 
against the government for suppressing the white race and making derogatory 
remarks about African Americans and Jews.34  Although the film also 
captured images of some weapons, Brandenburg’s speech did not overtly call 
for any type of violence, and he was never shown carrying a weapon.35  
Importantly, there were only about twelve Klan members present, along with 
the television reporter and camera operator for the story, who were the only 
nonmembers.36 
The Court overturned Brandenburg’s conviction, overruled Whitney v. 
California,37 and held that the First Amendment prohibits the government 
from punishing “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012). 
 27. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 28. Id. at 516–17 (plurality opinion). 
 29. Id. at 510. 
 30. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 1046. 
 31. Id.  
 32. STONE, supra note 6, at 543. 
 33. Brandenberg v. United States, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (per curiam). 
 34. Id. at 445–47. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
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and is likely to incite or produce such action.”38  This Brandenburg test is 
most commonly understood to impose three prerequisites on the state.39  
First, it must show that the speaker intended to (“directed to”) incite 
imminent lawless action.40  Second, the speech must be likely to be successful 
in its provocation of unlawful behavior in the specific context.41  Finally, the 
law violation must be likely, under the circumstances, to be imminent.42  
Subsequent cases have wholeheartedly embraced the Brandenburg 
formulation.43 
Unlike the categories of no-value speech, such as obscenity and fighting 
words, at no point has the Court ever categorically excluded unlawful 
advocacy from the First Amendment’s coverage.  Nor, for what I think most 
would agree are obvious reasons, has the Court treated such advocacy as pure 
speech, both covered and fully protected by the First Amendment’s 
guarantees.  Rather, the Brandenburg test reflects a preference for a regime 
of ad hoc, case-by-case (rather than categorical) balancing regarding laws 
targeting terrorist expression. 
As in all areas of law, in an ideal world, the relevant First Amendment 
doctrine would strike a perfect balance to achieve optimal deterrence.  That 
is, the Constitution would permit laws to regulate speech that is truly 
dangerous (that either has caused, or is very likely to cause, tangible harm), 
but would forbid any law prohibiting or even deterring pure political 
expression that has utility in promoting democracy, the search for truth, or 
individual autonomy.  A First Amendment standard that is too capacious 
could permit speech that causes devastating harm.  A free speech doctrine 
that is too narrow will prohibit or chill much expression, and the marketplace 
of ideas will be less robust. 
As numerous scholars have observed, Brandenburg adopted a highly 
speech-protective test.  Or at least, maybe it did.  Uncertainty over the 
definition of “imminence” and questions about how to measure likelihood 
raise concerns for some.44  Others question whether the Brandenburg test 
implicitly incorporates any sort of Learned Hand-like balance, whereby 
speech might be restricted even if there is little likelihood of actual incitement 
because the potential product of such incitement presents a substantial danger 
to human lives.45 
 
 38. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 39. See Kaminski, supra note 21, at 42. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 
U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).  But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 
8 (2010) (rejecting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the 
provision of material support to organizations identified as “foreign terrorist organizations”).  
As discussed below, the Holder Court did not even cite to or invoke Brandenburg in its 
analysis. See infra note 111. 
 44. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 21, at 43–46. 
 45. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 122 (2006) (“A huge harm unlikely to materialize for several more 
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The Supreme Court’s treatment of such unlawful advocacy reveals 
important things.  It is not inevitable that the law should treat advocacy of 
unlawful conduct as speech.  From a categorical-balancing perspective, one 
could make a normative claim that such advocacy is much more likely to 
cause broad, tangible social harm than, say, defamation of a private person.  
What this suggests is that even the early twentieth-century Supreme Court 
recognized that advocacy of unlawfulness has social value, even if its 
decisions did not always reflect that.  Without some type of meaningful 
constitutional scrutiny, government regulation of such expression could 
realistically suppress or chill what we might recognize as pure expressions of 
ideology. 
II.  EXCEPTIONALISM (SQUARED) 
Legal commentary often invokes the idea of exceptionalism across several 
areas.  Exceptionalism conveys the notion that, in specified areas of law 
where the courts consistently apply a particular legal doctrine or analytical 
framework, there exist certain subcategories of cases in which the courts 
depart from that framework because they view those subcategories as 
exceptional, or requiring a different set of rules.46  Often, this occurs without 
explicit recognition about what the courts are doing.  This suggests that the 
courts themselves do not recognize that they are departing from legal norms 
or that, if they do recognize it, they do not wish to publicly acknowledge it. 
Not surprisingly, there are debates about how to identify exceptionalism 
when the courts do not expressly articulate what they are doing and disputes 
over whether it is actually occurring in any given area.  In addition, even 
assuming that there is a form of exceptionalism occurring in an area of the 
law, there are frequently serious normative questions about whether it is a 
good thing. 
This Part argues that two distinct forms of exceptionalism may skew the 
development of First Amendment doctrine in an era of concerns about 
terrorist incitement on the internet.  First, there is the danger of national 
security exceptionalism, a concept that has frequently been invoked by First 
Amendment scholars to suggest that courts may relax free speech protection 
in cases (or in specific eras) involving acute concerns about national 
security.47  Second, there is the real possibility of internet exceptionalism, the 
idea that courts may create new First Amendment rules to reflect the 
“newness” of digital communication platforms because of concerns that the 
 
years is not a lesser threat to the nation than a much smaller harm likely to materialize 
tomorrow.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1489, 1491 (2012) 
(defining exceptionalism as “a comparative concept involving a contrast among sufficiently 
analogous sets of values and practices, where an apparent anomaly or special case is subject 
to descriptive and normative assessments”). 
 47. See generally STONE, supra note 6. 
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internet has fundamentally transformed human communication in ways that 
previous generations of doctrine do not adequately accommodate.48 
The contemporary “war” on terror roughly coincides with the proliferation 
of easy and fast electronic means of communication.  This implies that the 
modern era is one in which free speech doctrine may be particularly 
vulnerable to the dual pressures of these different forms of exceptionalism.  
Email communication became widely available in the mid-1990s, shortly 
before the 2001 terrorist attacks.49  Facebook and Twitter, two of the most 
popular social media platforms, went online in 2004 and 2006, respectively.50  
Thus, it is unsurprising that Brandenburg, itself a doctrinal correction to 
exaggerated national security concerns from a previous generation, is under 
great scrutiny as domestic terrorist incidents appear to be on the rise and 
organized terrorist groups seem to use social media and other internet 
communication platforms to expand their networks.51 
First Amendment doctrine should be sensitive to the possibility that calls 
to adjust the Brandenburg test and narrow the scope of speech protected by 
its admittedly capacious standard may be skewed by the way these two forms 
of exceptionalism come together (or as I say, get “squared”).  Their 
confluence may have the substantial capacity to distort free speech law in 
ways that each form of exceptionalism alone might not (or might not to the 
same degree).  Courts should therefore tread cautiously before departing from 
a legal regime that has, in retrospect, been largely successful in distinguishing 
between actual incitement and other forms of speech that should remain 
protected. 
A.  National Security Exceptionalism 
The national security exceptionalism narrative runs strongly through a 
broad band of legal scholarship.  The general theory of this type of 
exceptionalism is that courts show more deference to the state, and are 
correspondingly less protective of civil liberties, during times of war or other 
national security crises.52  From a descriptive standpoint, many legal scholars 
and historians have argued that such exceptionalism has occurred during 
various times in our nation’s history, most obviously during World War I, 
 
 48. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism:  An Overview from General 
Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2015). 
 49. World Wide Web Timeline, PEW RES. CTR. (March 11, 2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/world-wide-web-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/W9BT-
LRPQ]. 
 50. Company, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/company.html 
[http://perma.cc/Q6EG-CGPL] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) (scroll down to “Our leadership” 
and select the “Bio” link under “Jack Dorsey”); Our History, FACEBOOK, 
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/RQN3-XB5G] (last visited Oct. 
16, 2017). 
 51. See Rukmini Callimachi, Not “Lone Wolves” After All:  How ISIS Guides World’s 
Terror Plots from Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html [https://perma.cc/GC77-RNCD]. 
 52. Of course, exceptionalism is not limited to courts and can influence decision-making 
by other government institutions as well. See Sudha Setty, Obama’s National Security 
Exceptionalism, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2016). 
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World War II, and the Cold War.53  Although this Article focuses on speech, 
others argue that it also extends to constitutional guarantees of equality and 
privacy.  Perhaps the case most often associated with this phenomenon is 
Korematsu v. United States,54 in which the Court upheld the mass internment 
of persons of Japanese ancestry living in the western United States during 
World War II. 
When it comes to judicial review of laws restricting expression during 
wartime, the pattern, and historical evidence, is pretty clear.  Although some 
scholars have questioned the descriptive accuracy of this phenomenon,55 it is 
not uncommon to see the Supreme Court openly embrace exceptionalism in 
its First Amendment decisions.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in 
Schenck, “[w]hen a nation is at war[,] many things that might be said in time 
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected 
by any constitutional right.”56  The Espionage Act of 1917 itself, moreover, 
applied by its own terms only “in time of war.”57  The subversive advocacy 
cases that emerged during the Cold War were unequivocally influenced by 
national security concerns, often expressly stated in the Court’s decisions.58 
Some scholars have argued that national security exceptionalism is 
normatively desirable.  One common argument is that during emergencies 
courts may be uncomfortable shaping long-standing constitutional rules 
because they may not have full access to the intelligence information on 
which government decisions are based.59  Additionally, some commentators 
argue that there are credible concerns about institutional competence and that 
courts are justifiably deferential when national security is at stake.60 
 
 53. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 3 (2007); STONE, supra note 6, at 12–14; David Cole, The New 
McCarthyism:  Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 1 
(2003). 
 54. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  National security exceptionalism can also occur with regard to 
government efforts to compel nationalistic feelings and loyalty in its citizens. See generally 
Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 DENV. L. REV. 703 (2004). 
 55. Aziz Huq has observed that most of the theoretical work assumes that national security 
exceptionalism exists and debates only its normative desirability. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against 
National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 229.  He argues that, at least in the 
area of legal challenges to emergency detention policies, there is no empirical support to 
suggest that this descriptive account is accurate. Id. at 226. 
 56. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 57. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, 40 Stat. 217, 217 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 791–799). 
 58. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
words [clear and present danger] cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must 
wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is 
awaited.”). 
 59. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 53, at 5–6. 
 60. Id. at 17.  A somewhat middle-ground position is that national security exceptionalism 
occurs, but that over time the nation learns from the previous generation’s overexaggeration 
of such concerns, thus pushing government toward more modest responses. See Mark V. 
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?:  Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. 
REV. 273, 307. 
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Some of these same theorists have suggested that Brandenburg in 
particular needs to be modified in response to the most recent era of threats 
from terrorist actions, roughly post-9/11.  Eric Posner, for example, notes that 
“[t]he pattern in American history—and, in the other democracies as well, 
even today—is that during times of national emergency, certain limits on 
speech will be tolerated.”61  Posner views this not only as tolerable but 
strongly desirable.62  He suggests that never before have individuals and 
organizations from outside of the country been so easily able to use social 
media to recruit and “radicalize” supporters and encourage them to engage in 
violent or other criminal acts against the United States and its people.63  And, 
glossing over Brandenburg, Posner notes that prior to the 1960s, people 
could be punished for engaging in “dangerous” speech.64 
Posner has proposed an unprecedented law that would make it a “crime to 
access websites that glorify, express support for, or provide encouragement 
for ISIS or support recruitment by ISIS; to distribute links to those websites 
or videos, images, or text taken from those websites; or to encourage people 
to access such websites by supplying them with links or instructions.”65  To 
stave off concerns about legitimate uses of such sites, he would allow an 
exemption for those who could show that they have research, journalistic, or 
professional security justifications for accessing them.66 
Critics of Posner’s approach have already identified several serious 
concerns with his proposal.  First, the difficulty in administering such a law 
without censoring legitimate political advocacy is a significant danger.67  
Second, it has been argued that Posner may substantially overestimate the 
level of influence that ISIS propaganda has had in the United States and the 
extent to which it might have instigated tangible harms.68  As Paul Gowder 
points out, Posner’s column extrapolated his projection of harm from only a 
single anecdote.69  Reliable estimates suggest that there have been seventy-
one deaths from domestic terrorism events over a ten year period (2005 
through 2015), which amounts to about seven per year.70  Moreover, that 
figure includes deaths caused by terrorist attacks that are not related to ISIS-
inspired “jihad.”71 
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There are certainly other reasons to quarrel with Posner’s reasoning.  First, 
the speech doctrine relating to unlawful advocacy is, for obvious reasons, 
focused on the speaker, rather than the persons incited to act.  The dilemma 
turns on the concern about punishing someone for pure speech; it was never 
in doubt that the incited person could be punished for his or her actual 
unlawful conduct. 
Second, in the case of social-media-inspired violence, most speakers 
conveying ISIS propaganda are likely to be located outside of the United 
States and therefore beyond the territorial jurisdiction of American criminal 
laws.72  To be sure, this is why Posner’s proposal targets not the speakers but 
those who domestically access, consume, and redistribute their speech on 
social media or through more traditional means.73  But, as he points out, such 
a law clashes with existing First Amendment precedent protecting the right 
to receive information.74  Insofar as I can determine, the concept of punishing 
the audience for a speaker’s expression is completely foreign to American 
law. 
Third, there is an interesting and potentially troubling assumption about 
human agency related to both Posner’s proposal and the Brandenburg test 
itself.  Part of the justification for punishing the inciting speaker is that 
speakers in some circumstances will engage in such powerful rhetoric that it 
will virtually overcome the will of the listener, compelling him to engage in 
criminal conduct he would not otherwise have carried out.  The central idea 
here is not that the speaker was successful by virtue of her rhetorical 
persuasiveness but that she has somehow been so mesmerizing or 
provocative that the listener cannot help but act.  To some degree, this 
liberates the listener of any agency or moral responsibility.  It suggests that 
he cannot engage in autonomous cognitive function and could not possibly 
have listened to the speaker and made his own decision to act based on 
rational deliberation about the speech.  Posner’s proposed law assumes that 
cutting the audience off from such speech will protect them from what is 
essentially mind control through internet postings.  It is never questioned 
whether this understanding of communication is consistent with what we 
know about social psychology. 
Posner is by no means the only legal scholar to call for at least some 
modification to the Brandenburg test.  Alexander Tsesis, one of the most 
thoughtful of these critics, has criticized Brandenburg’s conclusion that only 
laws that prohibit imminently dangerous speech are constitutional.  
According to Tsesis, the Court’s decision “ignored a plethora of empirical 
evidence about the long-term effects of racist and ethnocentric propaganda” 
and showings that “[of]ten, ideologues prepare their followers for broad-
based, organized destruction through systematic, long-term 
indoctrination.”75  This observation is important because it pinpoints part of 
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the danger to national security posed by the particular ideologies of the 
radical groups associated with contemporary terrorism.  But it is unclear how 
the law could, consistent with generations of First Amendment doctrine, 
address long-term invocation of rhetoric to influence even racially or 
religiously hateful opinions, teachings, and beliefs. 
In contrast, many theorists such as Geoffrey Stone have been critical of 
national security exceptionalism, arguing that 
[t]hroughout our history, judges have erred on the side of deference in times 
of crisis.  Like other citizens, judges do not want the nation to lose a war, 
and they certainly do not want to be responsible for a mass tragedy. . . .  
Moreover, . . . judges, like other citizens, are not immune to the fears and 
anxieties of the moment.  This makes them even more prone—indeed, 
perhaps too prone—to err on the side of deference.76 
Similarly, David Cole has explained that 
there is reason to think that as a general matter in times of crisis, we will 
overestimate our security needs and discount the value of liberty.  Liberty 
is almost by definition abstract; it is measured by the absence of control or 
restraint.  Fear, by contrast, is immediate and palpable; it takes physical 
form as stress, anxiety, depression, a pit in the stomach, a bad taste in the 
mouth.  It is easy to take liberty for granted, and to presume that 
government powers to intrude on liberty are not likely to be directed at 
one’s own liberty.  Fear affects us all, especially after an attack like that of 
September 11.77 
In my view, the current threats to national security are, like those in our 
nation’s past, serious but also likely to be overestimated.  That is not to 
minimize the devastating loss of American lives that has already occurred in 
the first quarter of the twenty-first century.  But historical lessons should 
nonetheless breed skepticism, at least for now.  It is easy for the government 
to assert abstract national security concerns, and for the public to believe 
those assertions because citizens generally have limited access to information 
about the degree and likelihood of current threats.  It is, and always will be, 
difficult to objectively assess such threats in real time.78  This is why 
understanding our past record of addressing such threats is so crucial. 
Moreover, those who view national security exceptionalism as a good 
thing maintain that the dangers are not as great as we might think, since courts 
typically return to more robust protection of civil liberties during 
peacetime.79  But that argument assumes finite periods of national security 
concerns, such as traditionally declared wars against foreign nations.  To the 
extent that current terrorism threats justify an “emergency” exception to First 
Amendment speech protection, what do we do about the fact that the War on 
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Terror is not really a war, but an ongoing global problem with no apparent 
end?  As Stone observes, “if the [Bush] administration is correct that the war 
on terrorism will grind on indefinitely, that is all the more reason to be 
scrupulous in scrutinizing proposed restrictions of civil liberties.”80 
Yet another reason for skepticism about relaxing Brandenburg in the 
current era is that, in the current global climate, the targets of restrictions on 
civil liberties are more likely to be Muslims, a religious minority group (even 
if those who are engaged in violent acts are at the outer fringes of Islamic 
thought).  As Korematsu should remind us, it is certainly not unknown to our 
history for Americans to be particularly fearful of perceived national security 
threats from those belonging to minority religious, cultural, and ethnic 
groups.81 
Finally, skepticism brought on by exaggerated fears of national security 
threats must, in this case, be multiplied by the corresponding fears of new 
communication technologies.  This claim is elaborated below. 
B.  Internet Exceptionalism 
In considering whether to modify the Brandenburg test, we must also 
account for concerns about internet exceptionalism.  Mark Tushnet has 
defined internet exceptionalism as “whether the technological characteristics 
of the Internet (and, more generally, twenty-first century information 
technologies) justify treating regulation of information dissemination 
through the Internet differently from regulation of such dissemination 
through nineteenth- and twentieth-century media, such as print, radio, and 
television.”82  Translated to the current topic, the question is whether these 
characteristics should push us toward different types of regulations of 
terrorist incitement. 
Commentators have generally identified three distinctive features of the 
internet and social media that might justify different treatment under First 
Amendment doctrine.  First, speech on the internet can be communicated 
broadly and instantaneously (amplification).83  Second, communication on 
the internet is much less expensive than other modes of communication 
(cost).84  Finally, speakers using the internet can often mask their identities 
to listeners, at least in the absence of technological tools unavailable to the 
general public (anonymity).85  There is little dispute that these features make 
communication on the internet distinctive from traditional media.  The 
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question is whether those distinctions are sufficiently meaningful to require 
a new or modified legal regime for the regulation of internet speech. 
There has, of course, been much thoughtful scholarship addressing how 
and to what degree the technological transformation that has occurred over 
the past twenty years might require substantial alteration in the way existing 
legal regimes operate.86  Moreover, calls for modifying First Amendment 
doctrine in reaction to digital communication technology have ranged from 
concerns about the ease with which the internet can act as a shield for people 
engaging in hate speech and other forms of harassment,87 to the proliferation 
of “fake news,”88 to the infringement on intellectual property rights.89 
Here, the question is whether, in a manner similar to that reflected by 
national security exceptionalism, courts may feel the need to defer to 
government regulation of terrorist incitement made more possible because of 
rapid advances in digital technologies.  Such reactions may stem from fear 
generated by legal decision-makers’ lack of familiarity with such 
technologies just as they may stem from fear of threats to national security. 
Much of the literature on internet exceptionalism is normative and argues 
for or against idiosyncratic legal models for regulation of speech through 
digital technologies.90  There are, however, doubts about the degree to which 
the amplification, cost, and anonymity features change the qualitative nature 
of speech, whether that relates to the speech’s value or the harms it might 
cause.91  The amplification and cost factors no doubt make it possible for 
speakers to reach a wider audience than traditional communication modes, 
but do not necessarily change the content of the speech.  For example, so-
called “hate speech” can be conveyed through old-school techniques, such as 
direct verbal epithets, racist graffiti, or cross burning, but may potentially be 
directed at a wider range of targets through the internet.  Commentators argue 
whether that ability creates substantially more harm to a larger group of 
listeners than traditional communication.92  Claims regarding the anonymity 
feature generally relate to the fact that speakers may be emboldened to make 
more extreme statements when hiding behind artificial identities and may 
also evade detection for internet speech that otherwise might be subject to 
prosecution or other legal sanction.93 
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The argument for relaxing Brandenburg’s standard is that, to the extent 
terrorist incitement is dangerous, that danger is substantially exacerbated 
because of the availability of the internet.  Of course, terrorist incitement can 
take place through many different conventional communication methods, 
including in-person conversation, written letters, leaflets, memos, telephonic 
communication, and broadcasting over traditional television and radio 
networks.  But when conducted over the internet, that incitement is amplified 
at low or no cost and more anonymous than any of the other potential means 
of communication. 
Arguments for internet exceptionalism applied to incitement stem from 
these features but also rely on other claims.  First, some have argued that it is 
easier for terrorists to radicalize their audience through social media and 
other digital communication platforms.94  Eric Posner, again, writes: 
Today, the Internet makes possible the constant circulation of captivating 
videos, vivid images, and extremist text, creating a “radicalization echo 
chamber.”  It is the change in technology, more than the change in the 
nature of foreign threats, that has given rise to a historic and unprecedented 
danger from foreign radicalization and recruitment.95 
If there is a meaningful causal link between internet communication and the 
development of extremist views, and more importantly, actions based on 
those views, then there might be a strong claim to allow greater regulation of 
terrorist expression. 
It has also been argued that the amplification feature of internet speech 
provides another reason to permit greater regulation of inciting speech.96  Not 
only can terrorists form networks around the globe, but they can also incite 
violent actions by others located in distant lands with great speed.  This calls 
into question whether Brandenburg’s requirement that the speech in question 
be likely to cause imminent harm is too narrow to permit regulation of 
terrorist incitement. 
These claims in favor of internet exceptionalism for terrorist incitement 
have materialized through various proposals for reform.  As already 
discussed, Posner calls for a law criminalizing the act of accessing terrorist 
web sites or social media platforms.97  Lyrissa Lidsky argues for a more 
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limited adjustment to Brandenburg’s imminence requirement to address 
some types of terrorist incitement.  As she argues, 
The imminence requirement serves to prevent suppression of speech based 
on the government’s exaggerated fears of the danger posed by radical 
speech.  A satisfactory replacement for cyber incitement would focus on 
ensuring a direct causal linkage between the speech and the harm, focusing 
on factors such as the likely make-up of the target audience, whether there 
was a prior history of violence by members of that audience, whether the 
speaker supplied detailed instructions on carrying out the violent acts 
advocated, and whether the violence took place with little delay upon 
receiving the inciting speech.98 
Thus, her claim is not so much for Brandenburg’s imminence requirement to 
be relaxed but for a more nuanced consideration of the context in which the 
speech takes place. 
Tsesis does not overtly call for Brandenburg to be modified, but he argues 
that its imminence requirement substantially limits the government’s 
authority to regulate terrorist incitement on the internet.  His argument is 
more geared toward the idea that other legal doctrines might have to be 
invoked to address such incitement.  As he observes, 
The incitement doctrine applies only to imminently dangerous statements 
and is hence of limited value to combat internet terrorist incitement.  A 
statute containing such a component could be effective against immediate 
calls for violence through applications such as Instagram or Snapchat.  But 
the bulk of internet terrorist speech seeks long-term indoctrination, 
mentoring, recruitment, and so on; hence, policymakers need additional 
doctrinal guidelines.99 
Several things should give us pause before transforming or modifying 
existing First Amendment doctrine in reaction to these changes.  The same 
things that make speech potentially more problematic also make it possible 
to more effectively address those problems.  Hateful speech is cheap and 
easy, but so is counterspeech.  Perhaps terrorist speech can be used to incite 
a wider range of potential sympathizers, but so can propaganda that responds 
to such provocation.  One response to this argument, however, is that terrorist 
social media networks may incite violence or other criminal conduct over 
relatively secured networks so that counterspeech may not be a realistic 
possibility in this scenario.  But counterspeech need not necessarily take the 
form of persuading a particular individual not to carry out a specific, unlawful 
act.  Widely broadcast propaganda refuting radical rhetoric might operate to 
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dissuade potential terrorists.  Admittedly, however, there are serious 
limitations to the effectiveness of counterspeech if those who are predisposed 
to accept radical terrorist views are less likely to consult or believe alternate 
sources.100 
This brings us to the related issue of imminence.  The expression of radical 
terrorist groups through social media and other internet-communication 
methods is often not the type of speech that fits neatly under the incitement 
doctrine.  For instance, the type of long-term radicalization or indoctrination 
that these groups sometimes view as their goal relates to advocacy and 
teaching about their ideology—albeit sometimes an ideology infused with 
violence as a tactic—rather than immediate calls for a specific violent act.  
Unlike speech spurring on an angry mob, there may be a substantial lag 
between when speech is posted on a web page or Facebook and when an 
audience member reads and acts on that speech.  The ultimate goal of the 
speaker might be to inspire the listener to engage in a violent act at some 
indefinite time in the future, but that type of more abstract advocacy is what 
Brandenburg was designed to protect.  As Margot Kaminski observes, 
If groups can form so quickly that police cannot react, there might be an 
argument for ignoring the imminence requirement and allowing regulation 
before the call to arms happens.  This, however, is exactly why 
Brandenburg has an imminence standard:  the further back from actual 
harm regulation gets, the more it impinges on free expression.101 
Moreover, during the lag time, there could be other factors that cause a 
reader to become radicalized as well as substantial opportunities for 
counterspeech to dispute the call for violent action.  Thus, Brandenburg takes 
into account that there may be many reasons why the length of time between 
the speech and the act may diminish the danger—counterspeech, doubt, and 
regret developed internally by the listener, or concern about capture and 
punishment, to name a few.  These things are not likely to be true when an 
angry mob is incited. 
In addition, it is not clear just how much the breadth and speed with which 
radical messages can be conveyed on the internet necessarily justifies internet 
exceptionalism given our past experiences with other types of 
communication.  Other technologies prior to the internet also had the 
advantages of relatively low cost and wide dissemination.  The radical right-
wing “radio priest” Father Charles Coughlin, for example, is reported to have 
reached an audience of as many as 30 million listeners through his weekly 
radio broadcasts.102  The Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman—who was 
later convicted of conspiring to bomb several New York City landmarks—
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communicated and inspired his followers through conference calls and the 
wide circulation of cassette tapes containing recordings of his messages.103 
With regard to the anonymity that is enhanced by communicating over the 
internet, there are two general responses.  First, while anonymity could 
certainly be a valid concern for law enforcement agencies trying to capture 
and deter terrorists, as stated earlier, most inciters in this realm are likely to 
be outside the United States and therefore beyond its criminal jurisdiction—
a much larger impediment to law enforcement than anonymity.104  Second, 
as others have pointed out, the First Amendment was enacted against the 
backdrop of a culture in which anonymous political speech was recognized 
as a valuable feature of free expression.105 
In general, I am sympathetic to concerns that the technological changes 
wrought by the internet might not be as qualitatively substantial as initial 
concerns might indicate.  Or that, at the very least, we still do not know 
enough about how digital communication might transform things such as 
terrorist incitement to justify a major doctrinal change.  Jamie Boyle’s book, 
The Public Domain, describes a phenomenon that has useful parallels to the 
arguments presented in this Article.106  Boyle argues that in the regime of 
intellectual property, the content industry (i.e., movie studios and music 
production companies) typically has adopted what he calls a “20/20 
downside” vision of changes produced by digital communication and the 
internet.107  This influences them to see only the downside of piracy threats 
from the internet and to ignore or undervalue the corresponding potential 
upsides.108  There is a degree to which that same danger might occur in the 
context of terrorist incitement in the digital age.  Some policy-makers, judges, 
and scholars may have a 20/20 downside vision of what will happen if the 
current First Amendment doctrine is not adjusted to deal with the dangers of 
terrorism. 
One might object that in the contemporary era, the national security and 
internet issues are one and the same and that I am bootstrapping my 
arguments by contending that their confluence is more reason for caution 
than either factor alone.  Moreover, one could argue that the multiplier effect 
of both concerns—national security and internet communication—is 
precisely the danger to society that justifies at least a temporary exceptional 
approach to free speech doctrine. 
In terms of the first claim, it is clear from our long history of contracting 
civil liberties during crises that national security exceptionalism is by no 
means limited to the advent of the internet.  It is equally clear that internet 
exceptionalism concerns are not confined to issues concerning national 
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security.  This is exhibited by the discourse on how digital communication 
technologies suggest a need to modify other areas of law, such as intellectual 
property109 and privacy.110  With regard to the second argument, I maintain 
that we should, at the very least, be skeptical about the potential to propose 
exaggerated responses to multiple justifications for exceptionalism.  
Moreover, as I will explain in Part III, if there are grave concerns about 
national security and the internet leading to tangible social harms that cannot 
be addressed in any way other than relaxing the Brandenburg standard, the 
evidence of such a problem has yet to emerge in any concrete way. 
III.  BRANDENBURG TODAY 
Although Brandenburg has been the subject of much academic debate, 
particularly in recent years, it appears in practice to strike an appropriate 
balance.  In my view, even with some level of ambiguity, the test has largely 
produced results that comport with the Court’s objectives.  It seems in most 
cases to protect speech that is merely teaching or advocating for ideas that 
might be dangerous if implemented and to guard against the chilling effect 
on such speech.  But it also allows the government some latitude to prosecute 
those who clearly intend to cause real harm to the United States and are 
targeting an audience of people likely to cause that harm. 
While there have been few calls to broaden the Brandenburg test to protect 
more speech,111 there have been, as discussed, several suggestions about 
narrowing its holding to permit broader regulation of terrorist incitement.112  
Notwithstanding arguments for skepticism, one could argue that such reforms 
would be justified if many individuals who engaged in dangerous speech are 
successfully mounting Brandenburg defenses to their prosecutions.  But an 
examination of all reported federal cases since 9/11 that have cited to 
Brandenburg does not really provide any such evidence.113  Most of those 
cases have nothing to do with terrorism (again, perhaps because much 
terrorist speech that might be considered as inciting may come from outside 
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of the country and is therefore beyond the territorial jurisdiction of American 
criminal law).114  A handful of cases dismissed charges because the 
government failed to prove one of the three prongs of Brandenburg (intent, 
imminence, or likelihood of unlawful action).115 
Decisions adjudicating the claims of accused terrorists show that 
Brandenburg does not protect speech by those who advocate and provoke 
serious and imminent harm to national security interests.  In a handful of 
these cases, the courts have entertained, but ultimately rejected, Brandenburg 
defenses.116  In each of these cases, the courts have rejected the First 
Amendment claim and concluded that the United States has easily satisfied 
the intent, likelihood, and imminence elements of the test.117 
Also, in reviewing the available information about both successful and 
failed terrorist plots inspired by internet communications, it appears that 
many of the most serious threats do not come from generalized calls for 
action or radicalization.  Rather, these threats come from what can only be 
viewed as direct, step-by-step incitement and hand-holding that, were the 
speakers subject to criminal jurisdiction in the United States, would surely 
meet the Brandenburg standard and permit their prosecution.118  As one 
terrorism analyst has reported, “‘If you look at the communications between 
the attackers and the virtual plotters, you will see that there is a direct line of 
communication to the point where they are egging them on minutes, even 
seconds, before the individual carries out an attack.’”119  Thus, the actions of 
these groups far exceed the general type of advocacy that Brandenburg 
protects. 
Finally, again, there may be a degree to which the concerns about national 
security and the distinctiveness of the internet are at least somewhat inflated.  
With regard to national security, as cited above, the number of deaths related 
to terrorism incidents on U.S. soil are relatively few, particularly when 
 
 114. See Tsesis, supra note 72, at 4. 
 115. See, e.g., Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 244 (6th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (holding that members of a Christian group who attended an Arab festival and displayed 
anti-Islamic messages did not “advocate for, encourage, condone, or even embrace imminent 
violence or lawlessness”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2013 (2016); United States v. McCrudden, 
No. CR-11-061 DRH, 2015 WL 1198544, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015) (holding that an 
email calling for revolution was unlikely to incite such conduct), aff’d, 655 F. App’x 23 (2d 
Cir. 2016). 
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1245–50 (Ct. of Mil. 
Comm’n Rev. 2011) (considering but rejecting a Brandenburg defense), aff’d sub nom. Bahlul 
v. United States, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1307 (Mar. 28, 
2017); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]hile the state may not 
criminalize the expression of views, even including the view that violent overthrow of the 
government is desirable, it may nonetheless outlaw encouragement, inducement, or conspiracy 
to take violent action”); United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(stating that “such acts and statements that ‘instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit 
crimes of violence’ are not protected by the First Amendment and may be prosecuted” without 
explicitly invoking Brandenburg (quoting Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117)). 
 117. See supra note 116. 
 118. Callimachi, supra note 51 (quoting one terrorism expert as stating that foreign terrorist 
groups frequently engage in very explicit direction and control of individuals carrying out 
attacks in the United States). 
 119. Id. 
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compared to other causes of death.120  Furthermore, from the available data, 
the role of the internet in such incidents is not even clear.  According to an 
extensive report by the Cato Institute, the internet and social media played 
either little or no role in the bulk of domestic terrorism prosecutions brought 
since 9/11.121 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the legal system ought to be skeptical about 
calls to relax the free speech protections surrounding unlawful advocacy 
because we live in a time when such calls may be unduly influenced by 
inflated concerns about both national security and rapid technological 
change.  In claiming that the Brandenburg standard is sufficiently protective 
of general advocacy while still allowing room for prosecution of truly 
inciting and dangerous expression, I do not mean to minimize the human 
damage that terrorist-inspired violence has so tragically caused in our recent 
history.  At the same time, as Geoffrey Stone has thoroughly catalogued,122 
our longer history shows a tendency to overreact to what are perceived as 
new types of national security threats.  That history should give us pause 
when reconsidering First Amendment doctrine that has served the mutual 
values of liberty and security quite well for over a generation.  Societal 
reactions to the newness of the internet and social media platforms can 
similarly skew our thinking about the need for government regulation.  The 
confluence of these two types of exceptionalism should cause us to be 
exponentially wary of tinkering with the law of unlawful advocacy in the 
absence of strong evidence that the law has impeded the ability of the 
government to protect us from imminent danger. 
 
 120. Gowder, supra note 67. 
 121. See TERRORISM SINCE 9/11:  THE AMERICAN CASES (John Mueller ed., 2017 ed.), 
https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/SINCE.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMF4-3YVK].   
 122. See STONE, supra note 6.  
